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ABSTRACT
Providing healthcare services commands the largest allocation of public 
funding on both sides of the Irish border and concerns over the efficiency and 
effectiveness of these systems are perennial. Over the past two decades health 
has been identified as a key area for cross-border collaboration. However, in 
the absence of an overarching framework or strategy, there is little clarity 
about objectives. Using the responses to the Covid-19 pandemic as a case 
study it demonstrates that even in the face of an existential crisis, political 
leaders default to debates over culture and identity. The paper sets out how 
the healthcare systems in the two jurisdictions share similar core principles 
and values and face similar social, economic and political pressures. They 
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have adopted broadly comparable approaches to tackling systemic issues, 
such as an ageing and growing population, evolving healthcare needs, work-
force planning and financial pressures. It argues that there is potential for 
greater cross-border cooperation but this requires high-level political agree-
ment and must be based on robust evidence. As this paper shows, there are 
significant barriers to developing all-island approaches, but these are not 
insurmountable. 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades health has been identified as a key area for 
cross-border coordination. Theoretically, closer cooperation could deliver 
economies of scale, value for money, opportunities for clinical specialisation 
and the sharing of knowledge and good practice. This type of collaborative 
activity would particularly benefit communities that straddle the border where 
services are often difficult to access. While on paper the benefits of collabo-
ration are obvious, creating this dynamic across the constitutionally separate 
parts of this island is challenging and not supported by extensive evidence or 
research. Significantly though, the regular and repeated calls for further col-
laboration and cooperation have not been accompanied by any detailed plans, 
feasibility studies or robust data to support an all-island approach. Statements 
by political parties and policymakers urging improved cross-border working 
are expressed in general, vague terms. To date the approach has been mini-
malist and often project specific. Recent major policy reviews on both sides 
of the border have paid scant regard to this issue. There are major structural 
and financial differences between the health systems in Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland. However, they share similar core principles and 
values and face similar social, economic and political pressures.1 To a large 
extent they have adopted broadly similar approaches to tackling systemic 
issues. Key challenges include an ageing and growing population, evolving 
healthcare needs, workforce planning, rising costs associated with medical 
technology and increasing expectations. 
When compared to other European countries, both jurisdictions have poor 
population health outcomes. The main causes of premature deaths are the 
1  Jim Jamison et al., Cross border co-operation in health services in Ireland (Armagh, 2001).
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same: cardiovascular disease, cancer, accidents and suicide. Given the domi-
nance of healthcare issues in the politics of Ireland, north and south, the lack of 
knowledge and research is extraordinary. While this may be partly explained 
by the political sensitivities of all-island working, particularly for unionists, 
it does not explain why the potential benefits and barriers have not attracted 
substantial research attention. This article assesses the nature and extent of 
cross-border healthcare with particular reference to the differing approaches 
to tackling Covid-19. It illustrates that in many ways the responses to the 
pandemic provide a useful case study for research into the politics of health 
on this island. It also assesses issues of convergence and divergence, difficul-
ties with comparative analysis, and outlines the ways in which the response 
to the coronavirus has been informed by experiences of Brexit with political 
divisions shaping decision-making and the direction of policy.
THE PANDEMIC
Beginning with a cluster of pneumonia cases from a disputed source in Wuhan, 
China, Covid-19 has spread across the world with alarming speed and has 
become the defining health crisis of our time. Although we are physically 
distancing as individuals, the need to work collectively and in a coordinated 
way has never been more apparent. This pandemic recognises no borders 
and does not discriminate, is a phrase that has been used repeatedly in ref-
erence to the politics of an all-island response to Covid-19. While it could 
be contended that geographic considerations meant that Ireland was ideally 
placed to cooperate in the area of public health, the political realities were far 
from conducive to collaboration. This pandemic struck just two months after 
the restoration of devolution in the north following a three-year hiatus. The 
Brexit imbroglio added to already strained relationships between the parties 
and trust and confidence were in fairly low supply. In the Republic of Ireland, 
a caretaker government headed by Taoiseach Leo Varadkar was leading the 
country in the wake of an inconclusive election in early February.
Initial responses
At the outset the Northern Ireland Executive presented a united front and 
assured the public that the massive challenges presented by Covid-19 would 
be tackled jointly as the virus had no political consideration; it was neither 
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unionist nor nationalist. This was a significant moment both practically and 
symbolically, an agreement that party politics would be set aside for the over-
riding goal of saving lives. There was a recognition that a single strategy 
for handling the pandemic was paramount as the public were naturally con-
fused and fearful. This united front was however short-lived. The Republic of 
Ireland announced that the closure of schools, pre-schools and higher edu-
cation settings would take place on 12 March. Taoiseach Leo Varadkar noted 
that ‘Acting together as one nation can save many lives’.2 On the same day in 
the north, the first minister and deputy first minister jointly announced that 
the Executive would not be moving immediately to close schools and their 
decision was based on the ‘scientific evidence’. Evidently, there would not be 
an all-island approach to combatting the pandemic. Less than 24 hours after 
a joint press conference, Deputy First Minister Michelle O’Neill backtracked 
and demanded immediate school closures.
Her ‘solo run’ was branded shameful and utterly reckless by colleagues 
in the Executive. The first minister, Arlene Foster, expressed disappointment, 
but not surprise. The Ulster Unionist Party leader, Steve Aiken, accused the 
deputy first minister of causing ‘more fear and uncertainty’. He alleged that 
the move fundamentally undermined the integrity of the Executive. The 
emphasis was firmly on two jurisdictions rather than a unified approach. The 
health minister, Robin Swann, told Stormont’s health committee that deaths 
should be expected in Northern Ireland, but so far it was ‘not in the same 
place’ as the republic. Our approach is ‘different’, he stressed. The prospect 
of diverging strategies caused widespread dismay among the public who 
feared party politics was being prioritised over public health. Was it really 
being suggested that the coronavirus would respect the 310-mile border 
between the north and south of Ireland? Sinn Féin and the DUP’s instinctive 
defaulting to their constitutional positions when devising their responses to 
the pandemic was predictable and depressing in equal measure. In a tweet 
later reported in The Guardian, the unionist political commentator Alex Kane 
expressed his frustration and disbelief at the inability to set aside political 
differences in the face of a global health emergency: ‘Since coronavirus 
doesn’t give a damn about borders or identities it makes sense for Northern 
Ireland to follow immediately’.3
2  Irish Times, ‘“Acting together, as one nation, we can save many lives”, says Varadkar’, 12 March 2020.
3  Rory Carroll, ‘Ireland school closures reveal stark contrast to UK Covid-19 response’, The Guardian, 12 
March 2020.
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It was quickly apparent that the first minister and leader of unionism was 
determined to slavishly follow Boris Johnson’s approach, despite the fact that 
it inexplicably differed from World Health Organisation guidance. The PM’s 
policy miscalculation on herd immunity, a refusal to participate in an EU ven-
tilator purchasing scheme, a lack of PPE and failure to test, trace and isolate 
attracted sustained criticism. Despite this, the DUP initially appeared deter-
mined to stick rigorously to the British approach and refute suggestions that 
an all island approach was either desirable or justified. In the face of a global 
pandemic the first minister repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness and 
inability to break out of her unionist straitjacket. Conversely, her partners in 
government Sinn Féin stressed the need to adopt an all island approach with 
testing at the core of the battle against the virus. In a tweet following a joint 
press conference, Michelle O’Neill castigated the Department of Health over 
a lack of testing and PPE and stressed ‘as a political leader I have called this 
out’. Further cracks emerged when the Department of Health decided to follow 
the lead of Whitehall and abandon community testing—ignoring the World 
Health Organisation’s mantra of ‘test, test, test’. This decision was reversed 
months later when UK officials admitted they got it wrong and testing was 
resumed. While no political party would openly use the health emergency to 
score political points, it is clear that Northern Ireland’s first minister sought 
to assert the separateness of Northern Ireland from the republic, while Sinn 
Féin argued for convergence.4 Overcoming the deep political divisions, at 
least temporarily, and collaborating even when their constituents’ lives were 
at risk, presented huge difficulties for parties conditioned to prioritise consti-
tutional and ethnonational considerations. Decision making around the virus 
highlighted once again the fragile foundations of politics in Northern Ireland.5
Just days after the politicisation of the virus appeared to scupper any 
hopes of a united approach, a more coordinated strategy was agreed. On 14 
March senior ministers from the Northern Ireland executive—the first min-
ister, deputy first minister and health minister—met in Armagh with the 
taoiseach, the tánaiste and minister for health from the Irish government, 
alongside their respective chief medical officers to discuss north-south coop-
eration on Covid-19. A statement released by Northern Ireland’s Executive 
4  Barry Colfer, ‘The Covid-19 pandemic on the island of Ireland’, The UK in a Changing Europe, 31 March 
2020, available at: https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-covid-19-pandemic-on-the-island-of-ireland/ (13 October 2020).
5  Dan Haverty, ‘Not even coronavirus can overcome Northern Ireland’s divisions’, Foreign Policy, 24 April 
2020, available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/24/coronavirus-northern-ireland-divisions-sinn-fein-dup/ 
(13 October 2020).
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Office noted: ‘It was agreed that everything possible will be done in coordina-
tion and cooperation between the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland 
Executive and with the active involvement of the health administrations in 
both jurisdictions to tackle the outbreak’.6 The administrations in Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland accepted the need to work closely together 
on the Covid-19 crisis.
As the island of Ireland is a Single Epidemiological Unit (SEU) for disease 
control relating to animal health, it seemed that similar practical consider-
ations would pertain to the spread of human diseases such as Covid-19.7 As 
agreed at the meeting, the health departments in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland signed a Memorandum of Understanding.8 This commit-
ted ‘to promote cooperation and collaboration in response to the Covid-19 
pandemic’. They committed to working together on a number of key areas 
including:
•	 modelling the spread and impact of Covid-19
•	 the development of public health messages
•	 sharing information on measures such as testing, contact 
tracing and social distancing
•	 adopting consistent common messages where appropriate, 
such as on handwashing, hygiene and social distancing
•	 behavioural change, research and ethical frameworks
•	 cooperation in the area of research
Alongside this it was announced that the chief medical officers of Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland agreed to hold a weekly teleconference to 
update each other on the situation in their respective areas and ‘ensure mutual 
ongoing understanding’. Significantly, with reference to the development of 
6  Northern Ireland Executive Office, ‘Meeting of Irish Government and Northern Ireland Executive ministers 
concerning north-south cooperation to deal with Covid-19’, 14 March 2020, available at: https://www.
executiveoffice-ni.gov.uk/news/meeting-irish-government-and-northern-ireland-executive-ministers-
concerning-north-south-cooperation (13 October 2020).
7  Jess Sargeant, ‘North-south cooperation on the island of Ireland’, Institute for Government, 1 July 2020, 
available at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/north-south-cooperation-island-ireland 
(13 October 2020).
8  Department of Health, Ireland, and Department of Health, Northern Ireland, ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding, Covid-19 Response’, 7 April 2020, available at: https://www.health-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/
files/publications/health/MOU-NI-RoI-Covid-19.pdf (13 October 2020).
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public health responses, the memorandum also states that: ‘Consideration 
will be given to the potential impact of measures adopted in one jurisdic-
tion [or] the other recognising that the introduction of such measures may 
differ reflecting differences in Covid-19 transmission at different stages of the 
public health response’. Professor Mike Tomlinson suggested this statement 
was in fact evidence that the island of Ireland had been accepted as two epi-
demiological units, thereby foregoing the opportunity to exploit the potential 
for cross-border cooperation.9 Martin Unfried and Anthony Soares, mean-
while, suggested that the memorandum acknowledged the value of analysing 
the impact of any policies on the other jurisdiction, as public health measures 
introduced on one side of the border have clear implications for all citizens 
on the island.10 It was important to acknowledge that people will naturally 
want to understand why governments on either side of the border are acting 
in particular ways, especially if there was significant divergence between the 
two jurisdictions. It was completely predictable that fears could be magnified 
on the island of Ireland, where citizens in Northern Ireland, for example, may 
seek reassurance that the approach taken by the devolved government was 
on the basis of scientific evidence and not just politically motivated.
The memorandum between the health authorities of the two jurisdictions 
notes that cooperation in response to Covid-19 will build on ‘existing and 
long-established cooperation on the island of Ireland between the Participants 
and the health services including across cancer, ambulance and congenital 
heart services, and the strong pre-existing cooperation between the offices 
of the Chief Medical Officers in both jurisdictions’. While cooperation across 
the border in the area of healthcare does already exist, it is however rel-
atively limited with no proposals for significant expansion. North-south 
collaboration in healthcare has evolved in response to patient need, both 
in border areas and on an all-island basis. Many services are not under-
pinned by European Regulations, for example, the All-Island Congenital 
Heart Disease Network and the North West Cancer Centre at Altnagelvin 
are based on inter-governmental agreements between the respective health 
departments north and south, underpinned by Service Level Agreements. 
9  Michael Tomlinson, ‘Coronavirus: Ireland is one island with two very different death rates’, Irish Times, 22 
April 2020.
10  Martin Unfried and Anthony Soares, ‘Briefing paper: Approaches to the Covid-19 pandemic: Bordering on 
(non) cooperation’, Centre for Cross Border Studies, 2020, available at: https://crossborder.ie/briefing-paper-
approaches-to-the-covid-19-pandemic-bordering-on-non-cooperation/ (13 October 2020).
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Following the Brexit transition period, it is envisaged that these will con-
tinue on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the UK government and 
the Republic of Ireland.11
Health in Northern Ireland is a fully devolved issue and there has been 
extensive debate and disquiet about the rationale for following the Whitehall 
position rather than assessing national and international evidence and deliv-
ering a bespoke model for Northern Ireland. One key advantage of devolution 
is the ability to formulate policies tailored to local needs and priorities.12 The 
British government, like almost every other government worldwide, was 
seriously unprepared for this global emergency. However, the problem, par-
ticularly in the crucial initial phases, stemmed from an underestimation of 
the threat combined with breath-taking complacency. Fintan O’Toole has 
suggested that the coronavirus has exposed the myth of British exception-
alism which had also underpinned the approach to Brexit. He contends that 
this idea of exceptionalism helps to explain the belief that there should be a 
distinctive British policy response to the virus. According to him this highly 
delusional ideology helps to explain the slowness of the response, the deci-
sion to pursue the discredited herd immunity and the idea that the World 
Health Organisation was only relevant to low or middle-income countries.13 
The devolved government had the power and ability to chart its own course 
rather than blindly following the British government’s shambolic, count-
er-intuitive policies.
THE NORTH SOUTH MINISTERIAL COUNCIL
Health is already an established area of north-south cooperation. The North 
South Ministerial Council (NSMC), established under strand two of the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement, brings together the two governments on the island 
of Ireland to ‘develop consultation, cooperation and action within the island 
of Ireland’, and has health as one of the six agreed areas of cooperation. On 
his first visit to the north as taoiseach in mid-July, Micheál Martin agreed 
11  Northern Ireland Audit Office, ‘The UK border: how prepared is Northern Ireland for exiting the EU?’, 2018, 
available at: https://www.niauditoffice.gov.uk/sites/niao/files/media-files/Final%20Brexit%20Report.pdf (13 
October 2020).
12  Deirdre Heenan and Derek Birrell, The integration of health and social care in the UK: policy and practice 
(London, 2018).
13  Fintan O’Toole, ‘Coronavirus has exposed the myth of British exceptionalism’, Irish Times, 11 April 2020.
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to convene a meeting of the North South Ministerial Council at the end of 
the month. As agreed, the NMSC met in Dublin on 31 July. It was the first 
time that the council had met in three years as it went into abeyance during 
the three-year collapse of the devolved structures in Northern Ireland. The 
council acknowledged the development of a Memorandum of Understanding 
on public heath cooperation on Covid-19 and welcomed what was termed 
the ‘close productive cooperation’ that had taken place between the key 
personnel, north and south, to ensure an effective public health response.14 
Ministers noted the impact of the pandemic on the administrations north and 
south and agreed to continue to collaborate in the future. It was reported that 
they discussed ways of improving cooperation to tackle the pandemic but 
nothing concrete was agreed and no further details of what was discussed 
were released. Notwithstanding these warm honeyed words, collaboration 
and coordination had been limited and somewhat perfunctory. Despite the 
fanfare, this meeting appeared to be going through the motions rather than 
agreeing any substantial strategic changes in policy or practice.
STATISTICS AND DATA
A key issue to emerge from this pandemic has been the accessibility, reli-
ability, generalisability and robustness of the available data and the extent to 
which meaningful comparisons can be made across the north and south of this 
island. Epidemiological data are paramount to targeting and implementing 
evidence-based responses to protect the public’s health and safety.15 Nowhere 
are data more important than epidemiologic investigations designed to under-
stand and prevent the spread of a deadly pandemic. A longstanding issue in 
terms of all-island comparative research has been the limitations of the data. 
Allowing the data to be published is not about restricting the ability to pursue 
differing agendas, but about holding governments to account, learning from 
divergence, ensuring value for money and improving outcomes. This issue is 
14  North South Ministerial Council Joint Secretariat, ‘North South Ministerial Council Twenty-Fourth  
Plenary Meeting, Dublin Castle, 31 July 2020, Joint Communiqué’, available at: https://www.
northsouthministerialcouncil.org/sites/northsouthministerialcouncil.org/files/publications/Twenty%20
Fourth%20Plenary%20Joint%20Communiqu%C3%A9%20-%20Dublin%2031%20July%202020_1.pdf (13 October 
2020). 
15  Katrina Hedberg and Julie Maher, ‘Collecting data’, CDC Field Epidemiology Manual, Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2018, available at: https://www.cdc.gov/eis/field-epi-manual/chapters/collecting-data.
html (13 October 2020).
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of course not limited to cross-border research. Making comparisons across 
the four countries of the UK is beset by seemingly intractable problems.16
Comparisons are crucial and the British prime minister’s assertion that 
he was not interested in cross-country analysis of coronavirus was treated 
with a mixture of disbelief and dismay. Comparisons between countries such 
as Germany and Spain allow an assessment of the effectiveness of differing 
national responses and can then inform the formulation of best practice. 
Comparative assessments using health statistics and data from both parts of 
this island are far from straightforward. However, notwithstanding the diffi-
culties associated with statistics, they should be a key part of the debate about 
policies and outcomes. In this context a culture of transparency and account-
ability is crucial to ensure that policy is evidence based.
Concerns around transparency and accountability with the Department 
of Health in Northern Ireland are longstanding. Previous attempts at com-
parison across the four countries of the UK have been hampered by data 
that is not directly comparable.17 In their study of health and social care in 
Northern Ireland, Dayan and Heenan noted that the prevailing culture in the 
Department of Health was one of ‘a siege mentality’.18 The authors describe 
a culture of opposition to external scrutiny and oversight, a rigid top-down 
culture characterised by command and control. They note how they ‘expe-
rienced repeated and explicit refusals to engage with our work from senior 
officials. This went far beyond anything we have ever experienced in often 
challenging and critical research of the NHS’.19 This unwillingness to engage 
in independent scrutiny was not just implicit but also extended to circular 
emails to ‘discourage’ large groups of senior figures from participating.
Throughout the pandemic concerns have been raised in the north about 
the data and how it has been reported. In an extraordinary intervention at 
the end of April the UK Statistics Authority sent a letter admonishing the 
Department of Health over ‘gaps’ in its information. The Statistics Authority 
said there was ‘serious public concern’ about changes made in the way the 
16  Chris Ham et al. ‘Integrated care in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales: lessons for England’, The King’s 
Fund (London, 2013), available at: https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_file/
integrated-care-in-northern-ireland-scotland-and-wales-kingsfund-jul13.pdf (13 October 2020).
17  Ham et al. ‘Integrated care’.
18  Mark Dayan and Deirdre Heenan, ‘Change or collapse: lessons from the drive to reform health and 
social care in Northern Ireland’, Nuffield Trust, London, 10 September 2019, 28, available at: https://www.
nuffieldtrust.org.uk/research/change-or-collapse-lessons-from-the-drive-to-reform-health-and-social-care-in-
northern-ireland (13 October 2020).
19  Dayan and Heenan, ‘Change or collapse’.
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data was reported during the pandemic. The director general for regulation 
noted that ‘Daily surveillance statistics should be released in a transparent, 
easily accessible and orderly way’, and that ‘A news release on a departmental 
website and Twitter are not sufficient’. Furthermore ‘users should be provided 
with appropriate context and explanation, particularly now, where different 
statistics from different data sources are being produced and used in rela-
tion to Covid-19’.20 This intervention was welcomed on Twitter by Professor 
Gabriel Scally who noted that the Department was in ‘very hot water over 
their provision of statistics’. He had been critical of their ‘dreadful perfor-
mance’ and suggested they had ‘quite rightly’ been reprimanded.21
This unease about the culture that prevails in significant aspects of gov-
ernment in Northern Ireland and the apparent unfettered power wielded by 
senior officials and civil servants was further fuelled by a letter from the chief 
medical officer (CMO) to the vice chancellor of Queen’s University Belfast. 
The extraordinary intervention from the CMO, in which he expressed his 
concerns about advice on personal protective equipment (PPE) given to the 
media by a member of staff at Queen’s, was widely viewed as an attempt to 
muzzle independent experts. ‘Jaw dropping’, ‘inappropriate’ and ‘petty’ was 
the verdict of Professor Luke O’Neill, of Trinity College Dublin, on the letter 
which referred to ‘ill-informed commentary and communication’.22 In his 
communication, the CMO urgently requested that the vice chancellor address 
this issue as an internal matter and implored him to take all measures within 
his gift to ensure that the named academic did not give advice which was 
‘beyond his specific expertise’. The Alliance MP Stephen Farry suggested that 
the letter from the CMO marked a move into ‘dangerous territory’, as indeed 
was the attempt by the Department of Health to ‘spin it’. Very quickly a state-
ment was released from the Department of Health refuting any suggestion 
that there was an attempt to stifle academic opinion. This raises the question 
of what was the vice chancellor being asked to do? Why should experts not 
feel free to publicly express their opinions, particularly in a context where the 
CMO was unavailable for comment?
20  Office for Statistics Regulation, ‘Letter regarding statistical information relating to Covid-19 in Northern 
Ireland’, 30 April 2020, available at: https://osr.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/correspondence/letter-regarding-
statistical-information-relating-to-covid-19-in-northern-ireland/ (13 October 2020).
21  See Gabriel Scally, ‘A virus free island is within our grasp’, Irish Times, 15 June 2020.
22  Jilly Beattie, ‘QUB academic concern after virologists reportedly asked not to engage with the media during 
Covid-19 pandemic’, BelfastLive, 19 June 2020.
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This debate over the use of data and the challenges associated with mean-
ingful comparisons between the responses to Covid-19 was brought into 
sharp relief by the reactions to an opinion piece by Prof. Tomlinson, pub-
lished in the Irish Times on 22 April. In this influential article, he argued that 
rather than Ireland being considered as one epidemiological unit, different 
public health policies for fighting the disease had emerged on either side 
of the border. The question was did this divergence, with the north follow-
ing Westminster and the south following the World Health Organisation, 
produce different results? Or more bluntly, would differing approaches result 
in avoidable deaths? 
Prof. Tomlinson highlighted the difficulties of meaningful comparison with 
divergent methodologies for registering deaths on both parts of the island. 
However, notwithstanding these methodological constraints, the article con-
tended that there was robust evidence of two Covid-19 death rates on the 
island of Ireland. Acknowledging the practical difficulties with comparative 
evaluations, and that there were shortcomings with the available statistics, 
he contended that the statistical evidence should inform the ongoing debate 
around policies, such as testing and tracing. Following a critique of the infor-
mation available, he concluded that the republic’s death rate was two-thirds 
of that in the north. Acknowledging that this statistic may change as the pan-
demic progressed, he argued that ‘it is reasonable to assume that the north’s 
higher death rates result from lower rates of testing, the lack of contact 
tracing and the slower application of lockdown measures compared with the 
Republic’. Tomlinson concluded that the difference in outcomes highlighted 
the need for a coordinated approach across the island to tackle the virus. This 
should involve increased levels of testing and contact tracing and more robust 
public health surveillance at points of entry.
Prof. Tomlinson’s contentions ignited a substantial debate over the differing 
approaches and their implications for public health. Rather than welcoming 
a debate the Northern Ireland health minister, Robin Swann, was scathing 
and condemned his claims as ‘misleading’ and ‘ghoulish’. What was particu-
larly notable was that the main attempts to rebut his claims were not focused 
on public health considerations but framed in wider political considerations 
such as the constitutional question and the future of the United Kingdom and 
Brexit. Dr Graham Gudgin, Chief Economic Adviser to the London-based, 
pro-Brexit, right-wing think-tank, the Policy Exchange, penned a highly 
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critical response which was published in the Irish Times just two days later.23 
The economist’s condescending response was largely set in the context of 
the constitutional question rather than public health policies. He alleged 
that rather than valid public health concerns the debate on the pandemic 
had ‘boosted the war of words’ around Irish unity and this was ‘fuelling the 
contest over whether the north or south provides superior government’. After 
challenging Prof. Tomlinson’s findings in his missive, he suggested that the 
comparison between both parts of the island was not particularly significant. 
The key point was that death rates north and south of Ireland were markedly 
below those witnessed by Britain. The management of the pandemic was of 
second order to the fact that population densities on this ‘offshore island’ 
were one sixth of those in England. Aside from the disparaging reference 
to Ireland as an ‘offshore island’, in essence he contended that public health 
responses were largely an irrelevance. What mattered, he opined, was the 
nebulous concept of population density. It is worth noting that the impact 
of population density on highly contagious diseases has rarely been studied. 
While it might appear likely that higher population density would be associ-
ated with higher transmission of the disease, it is also associated with higher 
levels of access to healthcare and greater adherence to social distancing 
measures. Initial findings from large-scale studies of Covid-19 suggest that 
country density is not significantly related to the infection rate.24
Dr Gudgin further developed his ideas in a fifteen-page document enti-
tled ‘Covid-19 across Ireland’, published by the Policy Exchange.25 Bizarrely, 
the whole premise of the pamphlet appears to be based on the assumption 
that proving the death rate north and south of Ireland are broadly similar 
will strengthen the case for the Union. In the forward to the document, Lord 
Jonathan Caine, former policy advisor in the Northern Ireland Office, bemoans 
the fact that over the last couple of years it has become ‘increasingly fashion-
able to assume that a united Ireland is inevitable’. He outlines three factors 
that have led to this ‘grossly irresponsible’ position, one of which is what he 
refers to as the ‘weaponising’ of Covid-19 by those who advocate the need 
for an all-island approach to health as a means of promoting a united Ireland. 
In this publication Dr Gudgin claims he has debunked any assertion that the 
23  Graham Gudgin, ‘Covid-19: one island with very different death rates?’, Irish Times, 24 April 2020.
24  See Shima Hamidi et al., ‘Does density aggravate the Covid-19 pandemic? Early findings and lessons for 
planners”, Journal of the American Planning Association 4 (86) (June 2020), 495–509.
25  Graham Gudgin, ‘Covid-19 across Ireland: what the data can tell us’, Policy Exchange London, 2020, 
available at: https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Covid-19-across-Ireland.pdf (13 October 2020).
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republic’s response has been more sure-footed and effective. He asserts that 
his research proves that the death rate is broadly similar in the two juris-
dictions. He states this finding is supported by health authorities north and 
south, an assertion that there is absolutely no evidence to support. The pub-
lication demonstrates how Brexit has politicised and toxified the British-Irish 
political landscape to the extent that any attempt to draw comparisons in 
public health responses is automatically viewed through the lens of constitu-
tional threats.
EU F UNDING AND BREXIT
Since 1995 the region has received PEACE IV funding designed to support 
peace and reconciliation, and managed by the Special EU Programmes Body 
(SEUPB) since its establishment under strand two of the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement. In the most recent round, PEACE IV invested €270m, €229m of 
which is provided through the European Regional Development Fund, and 
the remaining €41m is match-funded by the Irish Government and the NI 
Executive. The region has also been in receipt of INTERREG funding since 
1991, representing an investment of approximately €1.13 billion in territorial 
cooperation.
Additionally, the content of the current INTERREG VA programme has 
four core objectives which include providing health and social care ser-
vices on a cross-border basis, which ideally will be mainstreamed into core 
services after the funding period. Various services have been established 
through INTERREG funding and rolled out by Cooperation and Working 
Together (CAWT), including the Multiple Adverse Childhood Experiences 
programme, which secured €5.01 million, and the Acute Hospitals Services 
project ‘Connecting Services, Citizens and Communities’, which secured €10 
million. Since 1992, CAWT and their partners have been collaborating and 
working together in the border region of Ireland and Northern Ireland in 
support of national government and both health departments’ priorities. The 
CAWT Partnership geography spans the entire border region, accounts for 
25 per cent of the total area of the island of Ireland and has a population 
of 1.6 million. The project designs practical and innovative solutions to the 
health and social care needs of the border region. This valuable EU invest-
ment, through the INTERREG VA’s health theme, and amounting to a total of 
€36 million across all projects for all areas, has provided the CAWT partners 
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with a unique opportunity to further intensify and embed cross-border health 
and social care activity. The CAWT Partnership has reiterated a belief and 
optimism that any post-Brexit agreements will not impede these now firmly 
established existing cross border and all-island health and social care arrange-
ments and future developments.26
The SEUPB recently clarified that even in the event of a no-deal Brexit, 
funding under the current PEACE and INTERREG programmes will continue 
until their conclusion in 2023. It is anticipated that funding programmes will 
continue after Brexit through a single PEACE PLUS programme as part of the 
EU funding budget for 2021–27. The UK government has given their com-
mitment to the PEACE PLUS programme and it is currently envisaged the 
necessary funding will be available irrespective of how the UK exits the EU.
A NEW IRELAND
Following the vote by the UK to leave the EU in 2016, the increased likeli-
hood of a border poll has been widely accepted as an inevitable consequence 
of this decision. It is further asserted that forcing the north to leave the EU 
when the majority voted to remain will ultimately hasten the creation of a 
united Ireland. While the extent to which this assumption is correct is debat-
able, it is indisputable that in the post-Brexit discussions of the future of this 
island, healthcare has moved to centre stage. On 21 September, when answer-
ing questions on the July meeting of the North South Ministerial Council 
(NSMC), Michelle O’Neill stated that an expansion of cross-border provision 
could help reduce Northern Ireland’s ‘dire’ waiting lists. Further stating that 
she was ‘quite sure’ there were avenues to work across the island to enable 
people to get the treatment that they deserve. There is no disputing the fact 
that waiting lists in Northern Ireland have spiralled out of control, with as of 
June 2020 over 136,00027 people waiting for their first out-patient consultant 
appointment, an increase of 30,000 compared to same time last year. In his 
2016 review of health and social care in Northern Ireland, Professor Bengoa 
stated that a pre-requisite for transformation of the system was securing the 
26  CAWT [Cooperation and Working Together], Annual Progress Report 2018, available at: https://cawt.hscni.
net/download/doc_library/corporate/CAWT-APR-2018-FINAL_2.pdf (13 October 2020).
27  DHSSPS [Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety], Publication of the Quarterly Northern 
Ireland Waiting Times Statistics, August 2020.
This content downloaded from 
            109.145.224.193 on Tue, 19 Jan 2021 11:14:49 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
132    Irish Studies in International Affairs   
trust of the public by addressing the waiting lists.28 In the subsequent five 
years since the publication of his report waiting lists have risen exponen-
tially. Significantly, the NI Executive has not produced a plan or a strategy to 
address this crisis and has lost control of the waiting lists.29 To simply call for 
further cross-border collaboration to address this fundamental issue in the 
absence of any strategic response from those holding the reins of power is 
meaningless grandstanding.
Attitude surveys repeatedly illustrate that access to healthcare is highly 
valued by people across this island. In the north, inclusion in the NHS with 
services free at the point of delivery is identified as one of the key benefits 
of being part of the United Kingdom. Until recently even the most zealous 
republican could not dispute the value of the NHS. The received wisdom for 
decades has been that the healthcare system in the north is far superior to 
that of the south. There are persistent and growing problems in the healthcare 
systems on both sides of the border. Many who support the idea of reunifica-
tion would baulk at the idea of paying to see a GP or paying for prescriptions. 
However, parts of the healthcare system in the north have effectively col-
lapsed and the differences between both systems are complex and may be 
further complicated by Brexit. The reality of the waiting lists in the north 
mean those who require elective care either pay for it or languish for years on 
a waiting list. The dreaded two-tier healthcare system has arrived by stealth. 
Unionists can no longer be assured that the NHS is viewed as an immutable 
asset. NHS spending per head of population varies between the four nations 
of the UK, it is highest in Northern Ireland, but the region has the poorest 
health outcomes. The republic’s complex funding system with a relatively 
high reliance on private healthcare is poorly understood and generally per-
ceived negatively. There is no doubt that in any future border poll, the funding 
of and access to healthcare will be a significant issue. Those advocating for 
change will have to convince people that leaving the NHS will not be detri-
mental to their health and well-being.
28  DHSSPS, Systems, Not Structures: Changing Health and Social Care (Belfast, 2016).
29  Dayan and Heenan, ‘Change or collapse’.
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CONCLUSION
The Covid-19 crisis is still unfolding; to date though it has demonstrated 
examples of positive working and highlighted underlying tensions and vol-
atility. The sharply divergent policies of the British and Irish governments 
presented a serious threat to the newly formed government in Northern 
Ireland. Sinn Féin looked to the Irish Government for advice and support and 
emphasised the advantages of viewing the island as a single epidemiologi-
cal unit. Unionists were uncomfortable with an all-island approach and took 
their lead from London. Even in the face of an existential crisis, the political 
leaders in Northern Ireland defaulted to their engrained positions on the con-
stitution and identity to devise their responses to the pandemic.
The approaches to Covid-19 have highlighted the deep political divisions 
that exist on this island. Whilst across the world politicians have set aside 
enmity and collaborated in the face of unprecedented challenges, here it seems 
that not even in a global pandemic, in a matter of life or death, will healthcare 
considerations supersede identity and constitutional issues. After a rocky 
start the parties in the north developed something akin to a joint approach, 
although the row over breaches of social distancing regulations at a republi-
can funeral has demonstrated the tenuous nature of this arrangement. Brexit 
has placed a huge strain on Anglo-Irish relations, there are historically low 
levels of trust between Dublin and Belfast and polarisation between the main 
unionist and nationalist parties in Northern Ireland. Exiting the European 
Union has evoked acute political sensitivities, resurrected old demons and 
created a very challenging, toxic backdrop for all-island collaboration. The 
public health response to Covid-19 illustrates vividly how entrenched polit-
ical ideologies can negate the geographical advantages of sharing a small 
island. From a healthcare perspective having two largely separate regimes on 
one island appears counter-intuitive.
Obviously, there are fears that an all-island approach will undermine 
current constitutional arrangements; however, the reality is that we share 
one landmass. It is also noteworthy that when previously faced with a major 
crisis the Dublin government naturally turned first to their near neighbours 
in London for advice and support. In this instance Westminster was com-
pletely bypassed in favour of Brussels and Geneva. Brexit has fundamentally 
altered the dynamic between Dublin and London. The Republic of Ireland 
now views itself as first and foremost a member of the European Union and 
this is where support, solidarity and advice will be sought.
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Cross-border health is a woefully underdeveloped area of public policy 
and there appears to be little appetite to address this by the administra-
tions from either side of the border. Aside from the notable exceptions of 
the Congenital Heart Disease Network and the North West Cancer Centre 
at Altnagelvin, there is relatively little activity in this key policy area. The 
respective focus on internal pressures faced by poorly performing healthcare 
systems means that enhancing collaboration and cooperation and coordina-
tion is afforded a low priority. In their 2011 report for the Centre for Cross 
Border Studies,30 Shane McQuillan and Vanya Sargent concluded that there 
was a range of potential benefits to be gained from increased north-south 
cooperation in healthcare. They identified a number of key acute healthcare 
services including cystic fibrosis, Ear Nose and Throat (ENT) surgery, paedi-
atric cardiac surgery, orthopaedic surgery and acute mental health services 
that would particularly benefit from collaboration. The report also suggested 
that the Erne Hospital in Enniskillen presented substantial opportunities for 
innovation in respect of service provision on a cross-border basis. Working 
together to address major health issues has the potential to deliver significant 
additional gains for the population of each jurisdiction, which could not be 
achieved by each system working in isolation and so much more could be 
done. At the beginning of June 2020, the north’s health minister launched his 
‘Framework for Rebuilding Health and Social Care’.31 Acknowledging that the 
health and social care system was in very serious difficulties long before the 
pandemic, he stressed that the virus had multiplied the challenges and pres-
sures. This document is a misnomer, it is neither strategic nor a framework. 
It does not address the fundamental issues including waiting lists, workforce 
planning, social care reform, technological advancements, prevention, and 
cross-border collaboration does not merit a mention.
Formal systems to support and facilitate knowledge exchange across 
this island are underdeveloped and limited. Currently shared learning and 
collaboration is largely ad hoc with little attempt to share good practice. 
Consequently, it is unclear which areas of healthcare would benefit most 
from increased cooperation and what are the main barriers preventing 
strategic developments. There has been considerable uncertainty about the 
30  Shane McQuillan and Vanya Sargent, Unlocking the Potential of Cross-Border Hospital Planning on the 
Island of Ireland: A Prototype Modelling Framework (Armagh, 2011), available at: https://www.crossborder.ie/
pubs/2011-cross-border-health.pdf (13 October 2020).
31  Department of Health, Rebuilding Health and Social Care Services: Strategic Framework, available at: https://
www.health-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/health/rebuilding-hsc.pdf (13 October 2020).
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nature and purpose of the new Shared Island Unit established within the 
Department of the Taoiseach. This Unit could provide a significant vehicle 
to undertake much needed research on opportunities for future cooperation 
and alignment in the area of health and social care. An evidence base setting 
out the opportunities and barriers to future collaboration would help to 
inform the development of policies and strategies. Political differences par-
ticularly around Brexit have weakened trust and reinforced a reluctance to 
share data, evidence and policy tools. However, it is inconceivable that post- 
Covid-19 there would not be a concerted effort to develop more integrated 
public health policies across this island. Issues such as tackling obesity or 
promoting well-being could be addressed through all-island messaging and 
campaigning. The two governments could give this issue some momentum 
by establishing an All-island Health Committee. Part of its remit could be 
to produce independent papers on possible areas of collaboration includ-
ing procurement of services, specialisms, data system, staff training and the 
sharing of knowledge. Ideally these would provide a series of options and 
provoke informed public debate and discussion.
In the context of the island of Ireland, advocating a cross-border approach 
in healthcare is politically divisive and can be construed as a means of pro-
moting a united Ireland by the back door. Anyone making the case for an 
all-Ireland approach to healthcare is savaged by some sections of political 
unionism and accused of promoting a ‘pan-nationalist agenda’. However, 
assertions about the benefits of an all-island approach are liberally employed 
by nationalist politicians with little or no underpinning evidence to support 
them. Debates on collaboration within nationalism rarely move beyond a 
benign motherhood and apple pie approach. Similarly, unionists extol the 
virtues of the NHS with scant reference to its glaring shortcomings. There are 
serious cracks in the NHS that are growing larger the longer they are left unad-
dressed. It is haemorrhaging money and resources due to an unwillingness 
to transform models of service delivery. Targets have been rendered mean-
ingless and waiting lists are just lists that get longer every quarter. Patching 
and mending with sticking plasters will no longer suffice, a long-term strat-
egy for improvement is required. Politicians are terrified of a negative public 
perception around their handling of healthcare as they know it could cost 
them their job. Evidence-based assertions about both healthcare systems are 
largely absent from the debate.
Meaningful collaboration and cooperation must be underpinned by a 
robust evidence base. What works and why? With reference to Covid-19 
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it was fairly straightforward to make international comparisons between 
national governments such as France and Germany but much more difficult 
to make comparisons between the north and south of the island. Rather than 
welcoming this type of activity as informative and essential, in the north 
this type of modelling is actively discouraged, dismissed or castigated. In 
the republic, it is largely viewed as marginal to the ‘real’ issues confronting 
healthcare, hardly a context conducive for building a sustainable, efficient, 
flexible healthcare system that meets the needs of all of its citizens. From the 
perspective of anyone interested in policy, politicians, civil servants, academ-
ics, policy advisers, service-users, the experiences around Covid-19 present a 
unique opportunity to share learning and establish what works in the diver-
gent approaches. The reality is any meaningful comparisons are hindered by 
a lack of comparable data, lack of structures to facilitate shared learning and 
political reluctance to engage in meaningful comparison. So much more could 
and should be done. Politicians in both jurisdictions must grasp the nettle 
and make a concerted effort to create an environment that prioritises open 
leaning, data sharing and identifying opportunities and barriers to knowledge 
sharing. And alongside this, build capacity and mainstream cooperation, and 
develop the infrastructure and environment needed to underpin effective pro-
active collaboration.
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